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DIVERSITY ENTITLEMENT:  
DOES DIVERSITY-BENEFITS IDEOLOGY 
UNDERMINE INCLUSION? 
Kyneshawau Hurd & Victoria C. Plaut 
ABSTRACT—Ideologies are most successful (or most dangerous) when they 
become common sense—when they become widely accepted, taken-for-
granted truths—because these truths subsequently provide implicit 
guidelines and expectations about what is moral, legitimate, and necessary 
in our society. In Regents of University of California v. Bakke, the Court, 
without a majority opinion, considered and dismissed all but one of several 
“common-sense” rationales for affirmative action in admissions. While 
eschewing rationales that focused on addressing discrimination and 
underrepresentation, the Court found that allowing all students to obtain the 
educational benefits that flow from diversity was a compelling rationale—
essential, even, for a quality education. Although ostensibly pro-diversity, 
this rationale positioned diversity as conditional on the educational benefit 
to the student body as a whole, including white students. Armed with social 
science evidence, subsequent affirmative action jurisprudence in Grutter and 
Fisher reinforced this rationale. While these cases proved favorable to 
affirmative action, the reasoning surrounding the benefits of diversity may 
prove deleterious to inclusion efforts in the long run. 
In this Essay, we first review the intellectual history of “diversity-
benefits” ideology in these key affirmative action cases, focusing on the 
recruitment of social science by litigants, amici, and the Court. We focus on 
how these legal actors have used social science to construct a view of 
diversity as a benefit to all, including dominant groups. In contrast, we note 
that the impact of discrimination and lack of diversity on historically 
marginalized groups has been largely, though not entirely, absent from this 
social science literature. We then examine the interracial contact framework 
that pervades the diversity-benefits literature, arguing that this approach is 
psychologically one-sided in that it focuses more on the benefits Whites 
receive from diversity than on how nondominant groups experience 
diversity. Moreover, because diversity-benefits ideology positions Whites as 
key beneficiaries, it could create a sense of entitlement to diversity. We 
explain that while it appeals to egalitarian sensibilities, it can simultaneously 
appeal to Whites’ psychological desires to maintain their position at the top 
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of the social hierarchy. Finally, we discuss an experiment we conducted to 
examine how four rationales based on those in Bakke affect policy support. 
Preliminary results suggest that diversity-benefits language may lead Whites 
to support policies that center benefits to white students more than policies 
tailored for nondominant racial groups. Furthermore, the study provides 
initial support for the role that egalitarianism and preference for racial 
hierarchy together can play in cultivating a common-sense entitlement to 
diversity. 
 
AUTHORS—Kyneshawau Hurd, Ph.D. student in Jurisprudence and Social 
Policy at University of California, Berkeley. Dr. Victoria C. Plaut, social 
psychologist and Professor of Law and Social Science and Director of the 
Culture, Diversity, and Intergroup Relations Lab, University of California, 
Berkeley School of Law. We thank Lyndsey Wallace for invaluable research 
assistance, as well as Joseph Cera, Melissa Freeling, Michael Colin Lindsey, 
and Dean Rowan from the Berkeley Law library, and Sarah Laubach for their 
help and guidance. We also thank the Northwestern University Law Review 
Symposium participants and editors, members of the eCRT Working Group, 
members of the Culture, Diversity, and Intergroup Relations Lab, and 
Andrew Bradt, Erwin Chemerinsky, David Oppenheimer, and Russell 
Robinson for their helpful comments. 
 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1607 
I. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND DIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE ........................................... 1609 
A. Bakke................................................................................................... 1610 
B. Grutter ................................................................................................. 1612 
C. Fisher ................................................................................................... 1616 
II. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DIVERSITY ENTITLEMENT ................... 1619 
A. Diversity Benefits in Psychological Research ........................................ 1619 
B. Diversity Ideology ................................................................................ 1623 
C. Modern Egalitarianism ......................................................................... 1626 
D. Dominance, Hierarchy, and Diversity Entitlement ................................. 1628 
E. A Psychological Cocktail ...................................................................... 1630 
III. DIVERSITY RATIONALES AND INCLUSION: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ............... 1631 
A. Overview .............................................................................................. 1631 
B. Procedure ............................................................................................ 1631 
C. Measures.............................................................................................. 1632 
D. Preliminary Results .............................................................................. 1633 
E. Implications for Inclusion ..................................................................... 1633 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 1634 
 
112:1605 (2018) Diversity Entitlement 
1607 
INTRODUCTION 
Not long ago, the authors of this Essay learned of a white student at a 
large university who expressed his disappointment that his classes lacked 
African American students. What made this student’s stance stand out was 
not that he had noticed the drastic underrepresentation of African American 
students or even his dismay, but rather his explanation: that he had paid for 
and expected the diversity that an education at this particular institution had 
promised. 
On the one hand, this response may seem surprising to those who 
recognize that students don’t actually pay for, nor are they entitled to, 
exposure to peers of a certain race. On the other hand, if viewed through the 
prism of diversity ideology, the student’s sentiment is common sense. 
Ideologies are most successful (or most dangerous) when they become 
common sense—when they become widely accepted, taken-for-granted 
truths—because these truths subsequently provide implicit guidelines and 
expectations about what is moral, legitimate, and even necessary in our 
society. In this case, the student’s sentiment comports with the “common 
sense” constructed over several decades by Supreme Court rulings on 
affirmative action, institutions of higher learning enacting diversity policies, 
and social sciences insisting that diversity is a benefit that enriches the 
education of all students, and sometimes even especially white students. The 
student’s statement also reflects how people often experience diversity along 
the dimensions of race and ethnicity; moreover, the focus on African 
Americans reflects the common association between the concept of diversity 
and certain racial groups.1 
We are certainly not the first to draw attention to the commodification 
of racial identity2 or the critique of the diversity rationale for affirmative 
 
 1 See, e.g., Joyce M. Bell & Douglas Hartmann, Diversity in Everyday Discourse: The Cultural 
Ambiguities and Consequences of “Happy Talk”, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 895, 903–05 (2007) (finding in a 
four-city study of diversity discourse that “respondents typically define diversity in broad and inclusive 
terms, but when asked to describe personal experiences with difference, their responses are almost 
exclusively tied to race”). For a review, see Victoria C. Plaut et al., New Frontiers in Diversity Research: 
Conceptions of Diversity and Their Theoretical and Practical Implications, in 1 APA HANDBOOK OF 
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION 593 (Mario Mikulincer 
& Phillip R. Shaver eds., 2015); Miguel Unzueta & Kevin R. Binning, Which Racial Groups Are 
Associated with Diversity?, 16 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 443, 445 (2010) 
(finding that African Americans and Latinos are most commonly associated with diversity). 
 2 See, e.g., Bell & Hartmann, supra note 1, at 909 (finding that respondents, and perhaps especially 
white respondents, understand the benefits of diversity through the lens of cultural consumption and 
expanded choice and from a white normative center, and highlighting the way in which diversity 
discourse frames people of color as contributors “to the enrichment of a presumably neutral ‘us’”); Nancy 
Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151 (2013). 
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action on the basis that it appears to benefit white students.3 Professor Nancy 
Leong, for example, has identified a system of racial capitalism, which is 
spurred in part by affirmative action doctrine, whereby non-Whites are used 
for their social and economic value.4 Additionally, Professor Daria 
Roithmayr has argued that the decision in the affirmative action case Grutter 
v. Bollinger “privileges white interests,”5 in part because it “focuses on the 
value” brought by students of color to the classroom.6  
Our project uses this previous work as a point of departure and asks 
what the law and psychology together can tell us about the development of 
the intuition informing the student’s expectation of diversity in education—
what we call the “common sense” entitlement to diversity, or diversity 
entitlement. In the first part of the Essay, we summarize affirmative action 
jurisprudence that has promoted a diversity-benefits rationale for the use of 
race in admissions while eschewing others that acknowledge racial 
inequality and open the door to remediating discrimination. We turn our lens 
to social science, uncovering how psychology itself has helped to nourish 
diversity-benefits ideology. We examine how psychological research has 
been enshrined in attorneys’ arguments, expert testimony of psychologists 
and other scholars, and amicus briefs submitted by social scientists, 
including psychologists. At the same time, we acknowledge that social 
science has also offered up plenty of empirical justification for the very 
rationales that the Court has systematically dismissed.  
In the second part of the Essay, we dive into the psychological and 
related literatures to describe more fully the burgeoning research that 
identifies the benefits of diversity and to explain the hegemonic assumptions 
that have prevailed in this work, namely that contact between groups is 
experienced in the same way by people of different groups. We stipulate that 
an analysis is needed of the ways in which ideologies about diversity reflect 
certain expectations about who will benefit from diversity. We then theorize 
the psychological mechanisms that animate the diversity entitlement 
expressed by historically privileged groups (e.g., Whites) who believe they 
are egalitarian, but still harbor a desire for hierarchy. 
In the third part of the Essay, we present a study that represents an initial 
attempt to empirically capture the effect of diversity-benefits ideology on 
 
 3 See, e.g., Daria Roithmayr, Tacking Left: A Radical Critique of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 191 
(2004); David Kow, The (Un)compelling Interest for Underrepresented Minority Students: Enhancing 
the Education of White Students Underexposed to Racial Diversity, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 157 
(2010).  
 4 Leong, supra note 2, at 2153–55. 
 5 Roithmayr, supra note 3, at 194. 
 6 Id. at 211.  
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inclusion-related policy support. We suggest that this preliminary study 
demonstrates that diversity-benefits ideology can undermine inclusion. 
Our Essay illuminates how social science and the Court’s use of that 
social science contributes to certain ideological understandings of diversity. 
Of course, the Court has not always been friendly to social science. For 
example, in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court discounted empirical evidence of 
racial bias in the criminal justice system.7 In this Essay we examine social 
science that the Court has weighed more heavily, specifically in its rationale 
for affirmative action.8 This research—on the benefits of diversity in higher 
education—differs from that in McCleskey in that it does not focus on 
discrimination at all. But, as we conclude, the Court’s elevation of a 
diversity-benefits rationale over remedially focused ones is itself 
symptomatic of the retreat from addressing discrimination and “a fear of too 
much justice” that plague opinions such as McCleskey.9 
I. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND DIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE 
In this Part, we trace an intellectual history of the nature of the diversity-
benefits ideology in key affirmative action cases in higher education—
Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher—in an effort to excavate the Court’s vision of 
diversity and how social science helped construct this vision. Of particular 
interest to us here are the ways in which social science has figured into 
advocates’ legal strategy, appeared in the Court’s reasoning about the 
purpose of diversity, or represented and perpetuated particular narratives 
about diversity through amicus briefs.  
 
 7 481 U.S. 279 (1987). For example, the Court argued that empirical evidence presented by Professor 
David Baldus showing racial disparities was “insufficient to support an inference that . . . 
decisionmakers . . . acted with discriminatory purpose,” id. at 297, and suggested that it “[a]t most . . . 
indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race,” id. at 312. For further discussion of the Court’s 
use of social science evidence in McCleskey, see Russell K. Robinson & David M. Frost, “Playing It 
Safe” with Empirical Evidence: Selective Use of Social Science in Supreme Court Cases About Racial 
Justice and Marriage Equality, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1565, 1570–72 (2018). 
 8 For example, see discussion of the use of social science in Grutter in Section I.C., infra. 
 9 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court’s slippery slope argument in 
McCleskey involved a concern that, should McCleskey prevail, discrimination claims would surface for 
other punishments, and any number of minority groups could claim discrimination. Id. at 315–16 (Powell, 
J., opinion of the Court). It bears noting that Justice Lewis Powell, who had previously penned a key 
affirmative action opinion, Bakke, discussed infra Section I.A., cited that opinion’s notion of a “nation of 
minorities” in making the slippery slope argument: “[i]n [Bakke], we recognized that the national 
‘majority’ ‘is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior 
discrimination at the hands of the State and private individuals.’” 481 U.S. at 316 n.39. Pointing to the 
“fear of too much justice” across affirmative action, criminal justice, and marriage equality cases, 
Robinson and Frost highlight “the Court’s preference for affirming civil rights only when doing so will 
not dismantle entrenched social hierarchies.” Robinson & Frost, supra note 7, at 1569. 
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A. Bakke 
In Regents of University of California v. Bakke, Justice Lewis Powell 
considered and dismissed all but one of several common-sense rationales for 
using a racial classification in admissions.10 In his opinion stating the 
judgment of the Court, Powell entertained the following purposes advanced 
by the university: 1) “reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored 
minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession”; 2) “countering 
the effects of societal discrimination”; 3) “increasing the number of 
physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved”; and 4) 
“obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse 
student body.”11 In a footnote, Powell also entertained a fifth purpose not 
advanced by the university: the “fair appraisal of each individual’s academic 
promise in the light of some cultural bias in grading or testing procedures.”12 
Interpreting the purpose of addressing historical underrepresentation of 
people of color in the field as a preferential scheme, Powell rejected the first 
rationale on the basis that it was “discrimination for its own sake” and 
constitutionally forbidden.13 Although he saw a legitimate interest in 
remediating discrimination, Powell rejected the second rationale as well on 
the basis that there had been no “findings of constitutional or statutory 
violations.”14 Further, he described societal discrimination as “an amorphous 
concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past.”15 Powell 
found the third rationale, facilitating health care in underserved 
communities, to be compelling, but he argued that the university had not 
proved that racial preference was required to achieve this goal.16 Regarding 
the fifth rationale, the one identified by Powell himself, he pointed out that 
the university had not suggested that its quantitative admissions metrics were 
biased or that the affirmative action program was designed to address such 
bias.17  
Powell did, however, find the attainment of a diverse student body to 
be a compelling rationale18—essential, even, for a quality education.19 And 
although each other rationale was ostensibly pro-diversity, only this one 
 
 10 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J., opinion announcing the judgment of the Court).  
 11 Id. at 306 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 12 Id. at 306 n.43. 
 13 Id. at 307. 
 14 Id. at 307–09 (citations and footnotes omitted).  
 15 Id. at 307. 
 16 Id. at 310–11. 
 17 Id. at 306 n.43.  
 18 Id. at 311–12. 
 19 Id. at 312. 
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positioned diversity as conditional on the educational benefit to the student 
body as a whole, presumably including the white students who comprised 
the majority of the student body. Powell’s argument rested on the notion that 
a diverse student body promoted an “atmosphere of ‘speculation, experiment 
and creation’—so essential to the quality of higher education” and that “the 
‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure’ to the 
ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.”20 The 
diversity rationale appeared to be premised on the value that students of 
certain backgrounds would bring to the education of the rest of the student 
body: “An otherwise qualified medical student with a particular 
background—whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or 
disadvantaged—may bring to a professional school of medicine experiences, 
outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its student body . . . .”21 
Quoting language from the Harvard College Admissions Program appended 
to the amicus brief authored by Harvard and other universities and to his 
opinion, Powell suggested, quite explicitly, that certain students offered 
something to the college that others could not: “A farm boy from Idaho can 
bring something to Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, 
a black student can usually bring something that a white person cannot 
offer . . . .”22  Further, the Harvard program directly linked educational 
quality with the presence of these different backgrounds, asserting that “[t]he 
quality of the educational experience of all the students in Harvard College 
depends in part on these differences in the background and outlook that 
students bring with them.”23 
The amicus brief, authored by Columbia University, Harvard 
University, Stanford University, and the University of Pennsylvania, went 
even further in its explicit characterization of diversity as serving the 
interests of white students:  
A policy of increasing the number of students from minority groups is, in our 
judgment, the best choice for all of our students because it is the best way to 
achieve a diverse student body. A primary value of liberal education should be 
exposure to new and provocative points of view, at a time in the student’s life 
when he or she has recently left home and is eager for new intellectual 
 
 20 Id. at 312–13. 
 21 Id. at 314. 
22 Id. at 316, app. at 323; Brief of Columbia University, Harvard University, Stanford University 
and the University of Pennsylvania as Amici Curiae app. at *2, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-811), 
1977 WL 188007. 
23 Brief of Columbia University, Harvard University, Stanford University and the University of 
Pennsylvania as Amici Curiae app. at *2, supra note 22. 
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experiences. Minority students add such points of view, both in the classroom 
and in the larger university community.24 
This excerpt implies that the role of students of color in the university setting 
is to enrich the educational experience of the sheltered white student. Indeed, 
the brief asserted that “the purpose [of the special treatment of minorities in 
university admissions] is not only or even primarily to confer benefits upon 
members of minorities” but includes improving “the quality of teaching and 
learning for majority” students.25  
Fifty-seven amicus briefs were submitted in Bakke, of which forty-one 
were in support of the university.26 To our knowledge these did not include 
any briefs of social scientists per se; however, social science does appear in 
the arguments of amici curiae. For example, the amicus brief of the American 
Association of University Professors specifically argued that the entire class, 
and indeed society as a whole, benefits from student diversity.27 Grounding 
their argument in sociological work, they claimed that this benefit is gained 
in part by “bringing the rather special experiences of members of otherwise 
significantly under-represented groups to bear in the give-and-take of class 
discussion and other collaborative academic work.”28 Once again, the 
introduction of historically underrepresented groups for the sake of 
improving educational quality for others lay at the heart of the argument for 
the benefits of diversity. 
B. Grutter 
Social science, and psychology in particular, figure more prominently 
in Grutter v. Bollinger.29 In Grutter, the Court once again relied on the 
diversity rationale to uphold the use of race in university admissions.30 
Specifically, it reasserted diversity as a compelling interest in finding the 
University of Michigan Law School’s admissions program—in which race 
 
24 Id. at *12–13.  
25 Id. at *27. Similarly, the brief states: “By our admissions programs, we are not merely contributing 
to the cause of increasing the numbers of minority leaders and public servants-although of course we wish 
very much to do that. We are also broadening the perceptions of our majority students, and we believe 
that this will be reflected in qualities that they will retain for the rest of their lives.” Id. at *14. 
 26 William Claiborne, 577 Law Briefs on Bakke, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 1977), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/09/17/57-law-briefs-on-bakke/b3cb7c7c-b70e-
4008-adc1-964886cbd552 [https://perma.cc/UJH6-UF8H]. 
 27 Brief of the American Association of University Professors, Amicus Curiae, at *2, *14, Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-811), 1977 WL 188010. 
 28 Id. at *7. 
 29 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 30 Id. at 327–33.  
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comprised one of many factors—to be constitutional.31 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor referenced amicus briefs from the 
military and from corporations to support the claim that diversity serves a 
“real” benefit.32 But she also relied on social science findings regarding 
diversity benefits: 
The Law School’s claim of a compelling interest is further bolstered by its 
amici, who point to the educational benefits that flow from student body 
diversity. In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at 
trial, numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning 
outcomes, and “better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce 
and society, and better prepares them as professionals.”33  
The bulk of this research suggests the benefits of diversity for improved 
racial understanding and cross-racial interaction, democratic citizenship and 
civic engagement, active and complex thinking, academic engagement and 
motivation, and intellectual and academic skills.34  
In fact, as the case made its way to the Supreme Court, the university 
itself relied heavily on this social science research, including research from 
one of its experts, psychologist and University of Michigan professor 
Patricia Gurin. Professor Gurin’s report detailed analyses from three large 
higher education datasets, one from the University of Michigan and others 
from universities around the country.35 Specifically, the university referenced 
her findings that experiencing racial and ethnic diversity in the classroom 
and in informal interactions was beneficial to students’ educational 
outcomes: “students who experienced the most racial and ethnic diversity in 
classroom settings and in informal interactions with other students showed 
the greatest engagement in active thinking processes, growth in intellectual 
engagement and motivation, and improvement in a range of academic and 
intellectual skills.”36 Notably, in prefacing Gurin’s research, the university 
argued that “expert testimony submitted by the Law School in this case 
 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. at 330–31.  
 33 Id. at 330 (citing Brief of the American Educational Research Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241); William G. Bowen & Derek Bok, THE 
SHAPE OF THE RIVER (1998); DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION (Gary Orfield & Michal Kurlaender eds., 2001); COMPELLING INTEREST: EXAMINING THE 
EVIDENCE ON RACIAL DYNAMICS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (Mitchell J. Chang et al. eds., 2003)).  
 34 For research cited by Justice O’Connor, see supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 35 Expert Witness Report of Patricia Y. Gurin at 3–5, Gratz v. Bollinger, 353 F. Supp. 2d 929 (E.D. 
Mich. 2005) (No. 97-75231) [hereinafter Gurin Report].  
 36 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 12, Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. 
Mich. 2001) (No. 97-75928). 
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provides unrebut[t]ed empirical proof for the common sense judgment that 
racial and ethnic diversity improves education.”37 
In addition to Professor Gurin’s report, the university also collected 
expert reports focusing on past discrimination and the effects of stereotypes 
on the performance of underrepresented groups. One of these reports, by 
historian Albert Camarillo, detailed the history of discrimination against 
Latinos in the United States and its long-term effects, including deficits in 
educational, employment, and housing opportunities.38 However, the 
university used Professor Camarillo’s report to set the context of segregation 
patterns—it argued, based on the report, for the necessity of bringing people 
of different groups together in higher education. It did not use the report to 
make an argument about the discrimination itself.39 Similarly, Professor 
Thomas Sugrue outlined the persistence of residential, educational, and 
socioeconomic color lines (and their discriminatory roots) and argued that 
“deep divisions” between racial groups “are a consequence of a troubled and 
still unresolved past.”40 He used these divisions to highlight the persistence 
of stereotypes that limit access to opportunity for African Americans, 
Latinos, and American Indians, and the continued lack of understanding 
between groups. Yet, the university focused primarily on the issues of 
intergroup contact and misperceptions in Sugrue’s report.41 Psychologist 
Claude Steele’s report testified to the influence of negative stereotypes on 
the performance of African American students;42 however, this contribution 
does not appear in the university’s motion for summary judgment in district 
court.43 
In contrast, the student defendant-intervenors in Grutter and its 
companion case, Gratz v. Bollinger, relied on social science experts in 
portraying the discrimination and hostile racial climate faced by 
underrepresented students,44 perhaps because they felt less constrained to do 
 
 37 Id. 
 38 Expert Report of Albert M. Camarillo, Gratz, 353 F. Supp. 2d 929 (No. 97-75231). 
 39 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 36, at 13. The university similarly used 
the expert testimony of Professor Eric Foner on historical patterns of racial subordination to discuss 
present-day segregation. Id. 
 40 Expert Witness Report of Thomas J. Sugrue at 67, Gratz, 353 F. Supp. 2d 929 (No. 97-75231). 
 41 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 36, at 13. 
 42 Report of Expert Testimony of Claude M. Steele, Gratz, 353 F. Supp. 2d 929 (No. 97-75231) 
[hereinafter Steele Report]. 
 43 The university cited the Steele report in a footnote, but only with respect to the general relationship 
between test scores and grades. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 36, at 19 n.11.  
 44 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents Kimberly James et al. at 43, 46, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 716302; Brief for the Patterson Respondents at 13–15, Gratz v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516), 2003 WL 367216.  
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so than the university.45 For example, Professor Walter Allen, who testified 
at trial in Grutter, and his colleague, Professor Daniel Solórzano, submitted 
an expert report on behalf of the student intervenors in Grutter and Gratz. 
The report detailed the results of a multi-method study on racial climate at 
the University of Michigan Law School and four of its feeder schools and 
found “persistent, extensive, debilitating discrimination against women and 
students of color” and that these groups “experience these campuses as 
hostile environments, places where they are either not welcome or are 
welcome only in clearly delimited, subordinate status.”46 The student 
intervenors’ brief in Grutter also cites Claude Steele’s expert report and 
deposition as well as the burgeoning literature on stereotype threat.47 The 
student brief used Allen and Steele’s testimony to argue that “grades do not 
have the same meaning across race.”48  
The University of Michigan received a substantial amount of support in 
the form of approximately 83 out of 102 amicus briefs submitted in Grutter 
and Gratz.49 Several of these were from organizations focusing on social 
science or education research. The American Psychological Association 
(APA) brief recognized the structural effects of discrimination and its 
implications for the opportunities available to students of color.50 It also 
suggested that although explicit bias may have waned, unconscious bias 
remains and may further limit opportunities for people of color and the 
effectiveness of diverse workgroups.51 In addition, the APA suggested that 
diversity “promotes harmonious and productive intergroup relations.”52 A 
significant portion of the brief was devoted to reiterating53 and defending the 
 
 45 Brief for the Patterson Respondents at 3, supra note 44 (“For understandable reasons, the 
University is reluctant to acknowledge that history, but Intervenors (whom Plaintiffs ignore in their 
presentation to this Court) have placed it in the record and argue its significance in this Brief.” (footnote 
omitted)).  
 46 Walter R. Allen & Daniel Solórzano, Affirmative Action, Educational Equity and Campus Racial 
Climate: A Case Study of the University of Michigan Law School, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 237, 301 
(2001). 
 47 Brief for Respondents Kimberly James et al., supra note 44, at 43 & n. 29 (arguing that stereotype 
threat “depresses minority students’ performance on tests thought to measure intellectual ability” and 
their “general academic performance”). Stereotype threat is the fear of being “judged or treated in terms 
of [a negative] stereotype, or that one could inadvertently do something that would confirm [the 
stereotype].” Steele Report, supra note 42, at 7.  
 48 Brief for Respondents Kimberly James et al., supra note 44, at 46. 
 49 Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347, 366 (2003). 
 50 Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Psychological Association in Support of Respondents at 5, 
11, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), and Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516), 
2003 WL 398321.  
 51 Id. at 5–6. 
 52 Id. at 4. 
 53 Id. at 15–19. 
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main findings of Professor Gurin’s research on the educational benefits of 
diversity and supporting its methodology.54 A brief from the American 
Educational Research Association, cited by Justice O’Connor, focused 
squarely on the Gurin Report and the educational benefits of diversity.55 The 
brief of the American Sociological Association focused on residential and 
school segregation, economic disadvantage, and stigma and their impacts on 
unequal access to resources.56 Notably, the brief used this context to argue 
for the importance of diversity in higher education. For example, it stated 
that “[e]ach student has the potential to enhance the educational experience 
for others, and universities have a compelling interest in identifying 
applicants who will contribute the most to that mix.”57 Taken together, even 
though two of the amicus briefs focused to a certain extent on discrimination 
and structural inequalities, the educational benefits of diversity remained the 
underlying theme of these briefs. 
C. Fisher 
In the Fisher v. University of Texas cases, the Court continued to rely 
on the notion of “educational benefits that flow from student body 
diversity,”58 and ultimately ruled a University of Texas race-conscious 
admissions program constitutional.59 Ninety-two amicus briefs were 
submitted in Fisher I, including seventy-three in support of the University of 
Texas, and nearly that number in Fisher II. About a half-dozen briefs were 
submitted on behalf of groups of social scientists (e.g., “823 Social 
Scientists,” “American Social Science Researchers,” “Empirical Scholars,” 
“Experimental Psychologists,” and “Social and Organizational 
Psychologists”), and professional associations such as the American 
Psychological Association and the American Education Research 
Association.60 Because these social science briefs were fairly similar across 
 
 54 Id. at 18–19 (defending Gurin’s research from the critiques made in the Brief from the National 
Association of Scholars). 
 55 Brief of the American Educational Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 398292.  
 56 Brief of the American Sociological Association et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 398313.  
 57 Id. at 21. 
 58 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208, 2010 (2016) [hereinafter Fisher II]; Fisher 
v. Univ. of Tex., 570 U.S. 297, 309 (2013) [hereinafter Fisher I]. 
 59 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2202.  
 60 In full disclosure, one of the authors was directly involved in two of these briefs. Victoria Plaut 
acted as a contributor to and signatory in the amicus brief of Social and Organizational Psychologists and 
as a contributor to the amicus brief submitted by the American Psychological Association.  
112:1605 (2018) Diversity Entitlement 
1617 
the two cases, we discuss them interchangeably, except where relevant.61 By 
our count, in total, over 1,300 social scientists signed on to these briefs. A 
number of other briefs also presented social science research, including, for 
example, those submitted by the National Education Association, the 
Harvard Graduate School of Education Students for Diversity, the National 
Black Law Students Association, and the Black Student Alliance at the 
University of Texas at Austin.62 
The social science briefs capture pre- and post-Grutter literature which 
continues the diversity-benefits thread from Grutter, arguing that diversity 
brings “increased cross-racial interaction among students, reduced prejudice, 
improved cognitive abilities, critical thinking skills and self-confidence, 
greater civic engagement, and improved leadership and workplace skills.”63 
But these briefs also represent a shift in focus compared to the social science 
briefs in Grutter. While most of the social science briefs—as in Grutter—
cited evidence for the benefits of diversity to all students, including to 
nonminority students, the briefs in the Fisher cases highlighted a wider range 
of benefits, including the mitigating effects of diversity on racial isolation, 
stereotype threat, social identity threat, and feelings of tokenism, as well as 
the ameliorating effects on social belonging.64  
 
 61 Of the seven groups mentioned here, five submitted amicus briefs in both cases, and one submitted 
a brief in Fisher I and then submitted a brief from an expanded and renamed group in Fisher II (the 444 
social scientists represented in the Brief of American Social Science Researchers became “823 Social 
Scientists”).  
 62 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Harvard Graduate School of Education Students for Diversity in 
Support of Respondents, Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297 (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 3308201. 
 63 Liliana M. Garces, The Legal Context and Social Science Evidence in Fisher v. University of 
Texas, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND RACIAL EQUITY: CONSIDERING THE FISHER CASE TO FORGE THE 
PATH AHEAD 3, 11 (Uma M. Jayakumar et al. eds., 1st ed. 2015). 
 64 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Psychological Association in Support of 
Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981), 2015 WL 6735840 (describing the effects 
of stereotype threat on cognitive performance, well-being, and persistence, and how stereotype threat can 
be reduced by increasing representation of underrepresented groups, thus mitigating racial isolation and 
the likelihood of underrepresented students being perceived as tokens); Brief of Experimental 
Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (No. 14-981), 
2015 WL 6774020 (providing an overview of the effects of stereotype threat on performance and 
psychological well-being, as well as how the experience of racial isolation and tokenism amplifies the 
effect of stereotype threat on underrepresented groups); Brief of Social and Organizational Psychologists 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (No. 14-981), 2015 WL 6774561 
(detailing in one section of the brief how campus diversity can reduce racial isolation and solo status and 
thereby lessen the effects of stereotype threat and increase feelings of social belonging); Brief of 823 
Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (No. 14-981), 
2015 WL 6754975 (highlighting the importance of creating an academic environment that fosters social 
belonging in order to lessen the effects of racial isolation and tokenism); Brief of Amicus Curiae the 
American Psychological Association in Support of Respondents, Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297 (2013) (No. 11-
345), 2012 WL 3527855 (same as in Fisher II brief); Brief of American Social Science Researchers as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 7, Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297 (No.11-345), 2012 WL 3308200 
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For example, the amicus brief of experimental psychologists argued 
that “[s]tereotype threat in college depresses the performance of many 
minority students”65 and “because of the phenomenon of stereotype threat, a 
college will have to take race into account if it wishes to admit the best 
students and to ensure that all students perform as well as they are capable.”66 
It further argued that “efforts to reduce stereotype threat” required 
“remedy[ing] the experience of racial isolation and tokenism that renews and 
amplifies stereotype threat” and that it was therefore “important to 
complement these strategies with mechanisms to promote diversity in 
college classes.”67 The amicus brief of 823 social scientists cited research on 
underrepresented students’ perceptions of racial climate, experiences of 
discrimination and stereotyping, and belonging on university campuses.68 
Another example is the amicus brief of social and organizational 
psychologists: in addition to discussing diversity-benefits research, this brief 
also focused on diversity’s ability to reduce the harms of racial isolation and 
stereotype threat, as well as the importance of institutional-belonging signals 
for underrepresented students.69 By highlighting these topics, the briefs 
explicitly addressed ways in which a lack of diversity and other harmful 
features of the environment were experienced by and impacted historically 
marginalized groups.  
This dual approach may signal an enduring tension, expressed in 
jurisprudence and bolstered by research in social psychology and related 
fields, over where the focus of diversity impact should lie when adjudicating 
affirmative action cases.70 The tension between focusing on the impact of a 
lack of diversity on historically marginalized groups and focusing on the 
ways in which diversity benefits historically privileged groups in particular 
may present unique challenges to inclusion and inclusive practices.71 In the 
 
(highlighting the importance of diversity in lessening the effects of stereotype threat and the subsequent 
positive effects this can have on underrepresented students’ performance; also arguing that diversity 
decreases racial isolation by providing more than a “token” presence in classrooms); Brief of 
Experimental Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297 (No. 11-
345), 2012 WL 3540405 (same as in Fisher II brief); Brief of Social and Organizational Psychologists as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297 (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 3308291 (same 
as in Fisher II brief).  
 65 Brief of Experimental Psychologists, supra note 64, at 25. 
 66 Id. at 31. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Brief of 823 Social Scientists, supra note 64, at 35–38. 
 69 Brief of Social and Organizational Psychologists, supra note 64 at 9–17. 
 70 For scholarship on the cost and distraction of focusing on diversity, see, e.g., Eboni S. Nelson, 
Examining the Costs of Diversity, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 592–98 (2009); Derrick Bell, Diversity’s 
Distractions, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1622 (2003).  
 71 Scholars have also highlighted that “diversity,” especially as conceptualized by Whites, typically 
omits issues of power and inequality, Bell & Hartmann, supra note 1, at 905–907, and has shifted focus 
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next section, we explore more deeply the social psychological research that 
nourishes this tension and uncover psychological mechanisms that may 
animate a diversity entitlement that leads people to choose one focus over 
another. 
II. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DIVERSITY ENTITLEMENT 
Social science offers insight into the complicated set of processes that 
undergird the supremacy the diversity rationale has enjoyed in affirmative 
action jurisprudence. Further, psychological research specifically can 
uncover ways in which the rationale may actually serve to foster a sense of 
entitlement to diversity that adversely impacts inclusive efforts. This Part 
discusses the foundations of individual psychological orientations that allow 
the diversity rationale a psychological platform to cultivate diversity 
entitlement. To do this, we first survey the literature that demonstrates the 
psychological benefits dominant group members can derive from diversity—
literature that was used to bolster the diversity rationale’s use in affirmative 
action jurisprudence. We then turn to the psychological literature on 
diversity ideologies, or shared understandings about how to approach 
diversity. Here we discuss how diversity benefits, when examined through 
an ideological lens, may have psychological consequences that 
psychological research has yet to fully investigate. Finally, we discuss two 
psychological orientations that may animate mechanisms operating within 
the diversity-benefits ideology to facilitate an entitlement to diversity and 
harm inclusion in higher education. This examination of the psychological 
underpinnings of diversity-benefits ideology gives us insight into the 
influence it may have on the psychological experience and institutional 
practices of inclusion in higher education. 
A. Diversity Benefits in Psychological Research 
Social psychological research, along with research in other social 
sciences, catalogues a robust set of physiological, psychological, and 
interpersonal benefits derived from diversity. Diversity, this research 
suggests, can ease racial anxiety and threat. Interactions among people from 
different identity groups (e.g., racial, gender, or sexual-orientation groups) 
 
away from “discrimination, injustice, and historical disenfranchisement” in organizations, Lauren B. 
Edelman, Sally Riggs Fuller & Iona Mara-Drita, Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 
106 AM. J. SOC. 1589, 1632 (2001). For an examination of the shift from the legal to business case for 
diversity in organizations, see also Jamillah Bowman Williams, Breaking Down Bias: Legal Mandates 
vs. Corporate Interests, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1473, 1480–87 (2017).  
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are plagued by anxiety, stress, and tension.72 This tension manifests not only 
psychologically,73 but also physiologically in cardiovascular reactivity, 
increased cortisol production, and changes in heart rate and breathing.74 
Research shows that experience with diverse groups of people can improve 
physiological regulation of cardiovascular threat responses to someone of a 
stigmatized race,75 result in faster cessation of cortisol production,76 and 
result in faster return to regular heart rate.77 The physiological regulation 
resulting from increased interracial contact facilitates long-term 
cardiovascular health.78 Benefits of diversity, according to this literature, 
also extend to prejudice reduction. For example, studies examining the 
effects of interracial roommate assignments in college generally find 
improved racial attitudes.79  
In addition to improved physiological reactions, lower anxiety levels, 
and prejudice reduction, social science research demonstrates that interracial 
contact improves cognitive processing,80 critical thinking,81 and problem-
solving.82 Comparing racially homogeneous and racially heterogeneous 
discussion groups, one study showed that the presence of racial minorities 
increased the complexity with which students—especially students from the 
racial majority—approach a given issue.83 Members from homogeneous 
 
 72 Jim Blascovich et al., Perceiver Threat in Social Interactions with Stigmatized Others, 80 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 253, 266 (2001). 
 73 Jennifer A. Richeson, Sophie Trawalter & J. Nicole Shelton, African Americans’ Implicit Racial 
Attitudes and the Depletion of Executive Function After Interracial Interactions, 23 SOC. COGNITION 336, 
337 (2005). 
 74 Blascovich et al., supra note 72, at 266; Elizabeth Page-Gould et al., Intergroup Contact 
Facilitates Physiological Recovery Following Stressful Intergroup Interactions, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 854, 856 (2010). 
 75 Blascovich et al., supra note 72, at 266. 
 76 Page-Gould et al., supra note 74, at 857. 
 77 Id. at 854–56. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Natalie J. Shook & Russell H. Fazio, Interracial Roommate Relationships: An Experimental Field 
Test of the Contact Hypothesis, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 717, 721 (2008); Colette Van Laar et al., The Effect of 
University Roommate Contact on Ethnic Attitudes and Behavior, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 
329, 329 (2005). 
 80 Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple 
Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 604–05 
(2006); Samuel R. Sommers, Lindsey S. Warp & Corrine C. Mahoney, Cognitive Effects of Racial 
Diversity: White Individuals’ Information Processing in Heterogeneous Groups, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1129, 1129 (2008). 
 81 Anthony Lising Antonio et al., Effects of Racial Diversity on Complex Thinking in College 
Students, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 507, 509 (2004). 
 82 Nida Denson & Shirley Zhang, The Impact of Student Experiences with Diversity on Developing 
Graduate Attributes, 35 STUD. HIGHER EDUC. 529, 529 (2010). 
 83 Antonio et al., supra note 81, at 509. 
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groups exhibited no such cognitive stimulation.84 Some research suggests 
that interracial contact fosters such improved critical thinking not just 
because of what racial minorities have to say, but because of how Whites 
cognitively categorize them. In other words, when people of different races 
engage each other, they often are confronted with surprising attributes or 
opinions that challenge existing stereotypes. Processing these unexpected 
category combinations requires deeper and more creative thinking than 
simply relying on preconceived stereotypes.85  
Prejudice has long been a central concern of social psychological 
research.86 Given the sordid history of racial and other types of oppression 
in the United States, it comes as no surprise that research demonstrates 
persisting anxiety, tension, prejudice, and stereotypes that plague intergroup 
interactions. Social psychology has also developed a large body of literature 
devoted to fostering harmonious intergroup relations, primarily through the 
reduction of prejudice, characterized as antipathy towards other groups. In 
fact, social psychology’s investment in mitigating negative feelings about 
historically oppressed groups through prejudice reduction represents a 
substantial portion of research on diversity benefits.87 Dixon and colleagues, 
in their research on prejudice-reduction models of social change, 
characterize the phenomenon nicely when they say: “If negative evaluation 
of the disadvantaged is defined as the problem, then the emotional and 
cognitive rehabilitation of the advantaged becomes the solution.”88  
Researchers prioritized intergroup contact, particularly interracial 
contact, as a primary means of reducing prejudice. Indeed, a meta-analysis 
of over 515 studies found that contact between racial and ethnic groups 
reduces prejudice.89 Moreover, interracial interaction appears to reduce 
implicit and explicit prejudices in the development of interpersonal 
relationships. One meta-analysis of eighty-one studies spanning forty years 
of research found that, initially, participants engaging in interracial 
interactions report more negative emotions (e.g., anxiety) than participants 
 
 84 Id. 
 85 Richard J. Crisp & Rhiannon N. Turner, Cognitive Adaptation to the Experience of Social and 
Cultural Diversity, 137 PSYCHOL. BULL. 242, 242 (2011).  
 86 See generally GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954).  
 87 Id.; Rupert Brown & Miles Hewstone, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Contact, in 37 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 255, 258 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2005); Thomas F. 
Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 751, 751 (2006). 
 88 John Dixon et al., Beyond Prejudice: Are Negative Evaluations the Problem and Is Getting Us to 
Like One Another More the Solution?, 35 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 411, 417 (2012). 
 89 Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 87, at 751.  
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in same-race interactions.90 However, over time, repeated interracial 
interactions produced more positive emotional experiences.91 The 
aforementioned research on college roommates also suggests benefits of 
interracial contact. In one study, racial attitudes of white students randomly 
assigned to room with a black student became more positive toward black 
people, whereas the racial attitudes of white students in same-race roommate 
assignments did not change.92 Whites in interracial rooms also reported 
decreased intergroup anxiety toward black people.93 In another study, both 
when roommate assignments were random and when they were voluntary, 
interracial assignments tended to decrease prejudice (with some 
exceptions).94 
The literature on diversity benefits highlights the myriad benefits of 
interracial contact. However, the prejudice-reduction framework that 
pervades this literature asserts a hegemony of psychological experience in 
intergroup contact—a portrayal of contact that is psychologically one-sided 
and primarily focused on Whites. In other words, by focusing primarily on 
remediating the negative feelings of the historically oppressive group, it 
assumes that historically oppressed groups experience contact in the same 
way as their counterparts. Additionally, although it is reasonable to assume 
that prejudice reduction has indirect benefits for the historical targets of 
prejudice, the focus of this approach is on the direct benefits to Whites. In 
sum, the outcomes and the psychological experiences of interracial contact 
are often portrayed as uniformly positive and equitable for all racial groups. 
The potential consequence of this portrayal is an ideological belief about 
diversity that positions the psychologically hegemonic benefits of interracial 
contact as supreme.  
What is the other side of the psychological story? Do people similarly 
experience and benefit from interracial encounters? Some research suggests 
that students benefit differentially from interactional diversity depending on 
their backgrounds. In one study, compared with students of color, white 
students benefited more in critical thinking development from exposure to 
 
 90 Negin R. Toosi et al., Dyadic Interracial Interactions: A Meta-Analysis, 138 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1, 
7, 12 (2012). 
 91 Id. at 20. 
 92 Shook & Fazio, supra note 79, at 721.  
 93 Id.  
 94 Van Laar et al., supra note 79, at 329. Researchers found several exceptions for contact with Asian 
American roommates. Whether randomly assigned or voluntary, contact with Asian Americans tended to 
make attitudes towards other groups more negative. Id. at 339. Furthermore, exposure to white roommates 
also increased symbolic racism among black respondents, and decreased Latinx students’ sense of 
competence interacting with students of other ethnicities. Id. at 337–38.   
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people from diverse backgrounds.95 Similarly, another study found that white 
students generally had larger gains from their diversity experiences than did 
students of color on many outcome measures, including general education, 
science and technology, and diversity competence.96 Meta-analytic research 
examining the relationship between greater contact and decreased prejudice 
also finds a stronger relationship for “majority status” groups than for 
“minority status” groups.97 A closer look at the roommate literature also calls 
into question whether the benefits of contact extend equally across groups.98 
And even the pivotal research by Patricia Gurin used in Grutter suggests 
potentially differential effects of diversity for different groups. For example, 
for African American students, some of the benefits of diversity derived not 
from other-race interaction but from same-race interaction and friendships.99 
The affirmative action jurisprudence, which relies on the diversity 
rationale, takes for granted that there are benefits to diverse contact. 
However, the aforementioned research suggests that we should be asking 
whether certain groups (e.g., Whites) may benefit more than others from 
interracial contact. Perhaps a diversity-benefits ideology acts as a façade but 
is not actually the reality, or at least not the whole picture, as it relates to 
diversity and inclusion. In addition, could a diversity-benefits ideology that 
positions students with marginalized identities (e.g., students of color) as 
vehicles for dominant (e.g., Whites) students’ growth, as opposed to equally 
positioned students poised to learn, undermine inclusion? Could it even 
create a sense of entitlement to diversity among white students? 
B. Diversity Ideology 
Existing research on diversity ideologies,100 across a variety of fields, 
excavates the influence these ideologies have in undermining or fostering 
 
 95 Ernest T. Pascarella et al., Do Diversity Experiences Influence the Development of Critical 
Thinking?, 42 J.C. STUDENT DEV. 257, 264–68 (2001). 
 96 Shouping Hu & George D. Kuh, Diversity Experiences and College Student Learning and 
Personal Development, 44 J.C. STUDENT DEV. 320, 329 (2003). 
97 See Linda R. Tropp & Thomas F. Pettigrew, Relationships Between Intergroup Contact and 
Prejudice Among Minority and Majority Status Groups, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 951, 954 (2005). 
 98 See Van Laar et al., supra note 79, at 329.  
 99 Gurin Report, supra note 35, at 37. 
 100 Diversity ideologies, or models of diversity, are “shared understandings and practices of how 
groups come together or should come together, relate to one another, and include and accommodate one 
another in light of the differences associated with group identity.” Victoria C. Plaut, Cultural Models of 
Diversity in America: The Psychology of Difference and Inclusion, in ENGAGING CULTURAL 
DIFFERENCES: THE MULTICULTURAL CHALLENGE IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 365, 368 (Richard 
Shweder, Martha Minow & Hazel Rose Markus eds., 2002). 
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inclusion.101 Much of the diversity-ideologies literature within psychology 
has pitted identity-blindness (e.g., colorblindness) against identity-
consciousness (e.g., multiculturalism), though their definitions vary.102 
Generally, colorblindness minimizes the use and significance of racial 
identity and suggests that race should not and does not matter.103 According 
to multiculturalism, group membership matters and should be 
acknowledged, respected, and even valued.104 Each ideology includes a set 
of normative beliefs that serves as a framework for institutional policies and 
practices and assumptions about how people should interact in diverse 
settings. The ideological orientations that people have toward diversity have 
real consequences and exert real influence on inclusion and inclusive 
practices.  
Reviews of this literature suggest that identity-conscious ideologies 
such as multiculturalism have mixed outcomes for inclusion, while 
colorblindness has somewhat, but not exclusively, negative outcomes.105 For 
example, colorblindness as a well-intentioned interaction strategy on the part 
of Whites can backfire in interracial interactions.106 It can also be used to 
justify current inequality.107 For instance, in one study, when threatened, 
 
 101 See generally, e.g., Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, The Structure of Racism in Color-Blind, “Post-
Racial” America, 59 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1358 (2015) (arguing that the racial ideology of color-
blindness is used as a more civil way of maintaining white racial dominance through a facially nonracial 
mechanism—making inequality more difficult to address); Angélica S. Gutiérrez & Miguel M. Unzueta, 
The Effect of Interethnic Ideologies on the Likability of Stereotypic vs. Counterstereotypic Minority 
Targets, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 775 (2010) (finding that interethnic ideologies (e.g., 
multiculturalism vs. colorblindness) have different effects on the perceived likability of a man of color to 
the extent that he either conforms to stereotypical caricatures of his group or is counter-stereotypic); Ian 
F. Haney-López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 
98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023 (2010) (arguing that colorblind ideology contributes to the mass incarceration 
epidemic); Eric D. Knowles et al., On the Malleability of Ideology: Motivated Construals of Color 
Blindness, 96 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857 (2009) (arguing that individuals’ intergroup 
motivations to maintain or undermine the status quo can shift their construal of colorblindness); Valerie 
Purdie-Vaughns et al., Social Identity Contingencies: How Diversity Cues Signal Threat or Safety for 
African Americans in Mainstream Institutions, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 615 (2008) (finding 
that diversity ideologies work in tandem with cues regarding organizational demographics to signal to 
underrepresented groups how they may be treated within an organization). 
 102 See Plaut et al., supra note 1, for a review. 
 103 Id. at 604–06. 
 104 Id. at 600–04 
105 Victoria C. Plaut et al., Do Color Blindness and Multiculturalism Remedy or Foster 
Discrimination and Racism?, CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI., May 14, 2018, at 1. 
 106 Evan P. Apfelbaum, Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Seeing Race and Seeming Racist? 
Evaluating Strategic Colorblindness in Social Interaction, 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 918, 
922 (2008).  
 107 See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE 
PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 25–53 (4th ed. 2014); Tamar Saguy, John F. Dovidio 
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Whites who preferred group-based hierarchy used colorblindness to defend 
the status quo.108 Conversely, multiculturalism has been shown to have 
positive implications for interracial interaction, engagement, and inclusion. 
In one large field study, employees of color working in departments where 
white peers hold more multicultural attitudes (e.g., supporting organizational 
diversity) felt more psychologically engaged and perceived less bias.109 
Among college students, exposure to a multicultural university statement 
(stressing strength in and embracing diversity) led to better performance for 
women of color than a colorblind statement (stressing similarity and that 
race, ethnicity, gender, and religion are immaterial).110 Relatedly, 
organizational diversity policies that stress differences (rather than 
similarities) foster leadership self-perceptions and goals among minorities.111  
However, multiculturalism is by no means a silver bullet among the 
arsenal of ideological approaches. Research suggests a variety of negative 
implications of multiculturalism—or an emphasis on valuing diversity—
when portrayed in a particular way or under certain circumstances. 
Multiculturalism can be harmful if it leads to pigeonholing—placing people 
into limited socially conscribed roles where they are valued mostly for their 
social identity.112 In one study, researchers examined the effects of priming 
multiculturalism (vs. colorblindness) on how likable white participants 
perceived a man of color who displayed stereotype-consistent or inconsistent 
extracurricular interests (e.g., a Latino who likes Salsa vs. Hip-Hop).113 
When exposed to multiculturalism, participants liked the stereotypical target 
more than the counterstereotypic target, suggesting that multiculturalism 
constrains racial and ethnic minorities’ identity expression.114 Thus, while 
multiculturalism is an ostensibly pro-diversity ideology, research observes 
negative effects for inclusion. It is possible then that pro-diversity/egalitarian 
ideological approaches can still undermine inclusion.  
 
& Felicia Pratto, Beyond Contact: Intergroup Contact in the Context of Power Relations, 
34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 432, 442–44 (2008). 
 108 Knowles et al., supra note 101, at 860.  
 109 Victoria C. Plaut, Kecia M. Thomas & Matt J. Goren, Is Multiculturalism or Color Blindness 
Better for Minorities?, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 444, 444–45 (2009). 
 110 Leigh S. Wilton et al., Communicating More than Diversity: The Effect of Institutional Diversity 
Statements on Expectations and Performance as a Function of Race and Gender, 21 CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 315, 315 (2015). 
 111 Seval Gündemir et al., The Impact of Organizational Diversity Policies on Minority Employees’ 
Leadership Self-Perceptions and Goals, 24 J. LEADERSHIP & ORGANIZATIONAL STUD. 172, 172 (2017). 
 112 See Robin J. Ely & David A. Thomas, Cultural Diversity at Work: The Effects of Diversity 
Perspectives on Work Group Processes and Outcomes, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 229 (2001). 
 113 Gutiérrez & Unzueta, supra note 101. 
 114 Id. at 777–79. 
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The literature on diversity ideologies provides insight into the role 
ideologies play in inclusion practices. The research explicitly examines the 
beliefs operating within these ideologies about how people are supposed to 
relate to one another. It does not, however, examine expectations about who 
is supposed to benefit when they do. Here we attempt to identify a 
consequence of a diversity-benefits ideology normalized in social 
psychological research: diversity entitlement. Why might an ideology that 
can facilitate entitlement enjoy such ubiquity in modern jurisprudence, 
organizations, and culture? We argue that the explicit hegemonic belief that 
diversity benefits everyone, while ostensibly pro-diversity and appealing to 
egalitarian sensibilities, belies very real racial differences in the way people 
psychologically experience interracial contact. As such, we hypothesize that 
an ideology that minimizes that reality may fall prey to and facilitate a 
psychological expectation or entitlement among dominant groups to the 
benefits enumerated within the literature.  
C. Modern Egalitarianism 
Values, or the commonly accepted standards of the goal-directed 
behaviors of human existence, shape people’s attitudes toward different 
groups in society.115 A common American value orientation is 
egalitarianism116—an adherence to democratic ideals of equality.117 
Considering the conception of prejudice as a negative orientation towards 
another group, and the proliferation of intergroup contact as the primary 
antidote for such antipathy, intergroup contact, diversity, and intergroup 
harmony appeal to self-identified egalitarians. Prior research has 
documented various correlates of egalitarianism. For example, egalitarians 
report lower levels of prejudice, greater political liberalism, and greater 
support for redistributive policies such as social welfare and affirmative 
action.118 
Although egalitarianism can have positive implications for intergroup 
relations, egalitarianism can be a double-edged sword. First, egalitarianism 
 
 115 See, e.g., Irwin Katz & R. Glen Hass, Racial Ambivalence and American Value Conflict: 
Correlational and Priming Studies of Dual Cognitive Structures, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
893, 894 (1988). 
 116 See generally JAMES R. KLUEGEL & ELIOT R. SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT INEQUALITY: AMERICANS’ 
VIEWS OF WHAT IS AND WHAT OUGHT TO BE (1986); HOWARD SCHUMAN, CHARLOTTE STEEH, 
LAWRENCE BOBO & MARIA KRYSAN, RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
(rev. ed. 1997). 
 117 Katz & Hass, supra note 115. 
 118 Arnold K. Ho et al., The Nature of Social Dominance Orientation: Theorizing and Measuring 
Preferences for Intergroup Inequality Using the New SDO7 Scale, 109 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1003, 1021 (2015). 
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does not exist in a psychological vacuum. Research suggests that in the 
absence of strong antidiscrimination norms, or when they have a race-neutral 
justification for doing so, people with an egalitarian self-image may still 
discriminate.119 Indeed, a large literature on “aversive racism” suggests 
possessing an egalitarian self-image can coexist with implicit negative 
attitudes towards disadvantaged groups.120 These implicit biases can have 
deleterious implications for intergroup dynamics,121 racial minorities’ 
educational achievement,122 and juror decision-making,123 just to name a few. 
In other words, racially disparate outcomes can persist despite explicit claims 
of egalitarianism expressed by the perpetrators of bias. Egalitarianism may 
mask individuals’ conscious awareness of implicit biases that they may hold. 
Thus, egalitarians can often be blissfully unaware of the ways in which they 
contribute to and perpetuate discrimination.  
Secondly, egalitarianism can serve ego-protective functions that 
preclude achieving professed egalitarian goals. Research demonstrates that 
being part of a group commonly associated with racism (e.g., Whites) 
threatens the group members’ identity as individuals and as part of the 
broader racial group.124 This threat may represent a fear that they will be 
perceived as prejudiced, or an understanding that they are part of a morally 
suspect group and their successes are not fully earned due to historical 
privileges.125 Because of these threats, maintaining or displaying an 
egalitarian self-concept may serve important psychologically protective 
functions for Whites. They might, for example, be motivated to demonstrate 
 
 119 See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 1989 and 
1999, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 315, 318 (2000). 
 120 See id. at 317; Katz & Hass, supra note 115, at 895; Eric Luis Uhlmann, Victoria L. Brescoll & 
Elizabeth Levy Paluck, Are Members of Low Status Groups Perceived as Bad, or Badly Off? Egalitarian 
Negative Associations and Automatic Prejudice, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 491, 496–98 
(2006).  
 121 See, e.g., Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their 
Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143 (2004). 
 122 See, e.g., Drew S. Jacoby-Senghor, Stacey Sinclair & J. Nicole Shelton, A Lesson in Bias: The 
Relationship Between Implicit Racial Bias and Performance in Pedagogical Contexts, 63 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 50, 53 (2016). 
 123 See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of Juries, 12 LEGAL 
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 171, 183 (2007). 
 124 See, e.g., Eric D. Knowles et al., Deny, Distance, or Dismantle? How White Americans Manage 
a Privileged Identity, 9 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 594, 601–02 (2014); Margaret Shih, Maia J. Young & 
Amy Bucher, Working to Reduce the Effects of Discrimination: Identity Management Strategies in 
Organizations, 68 AM. PSYCHOL. 145, 157 (2013).  
 125 Knowles et al., supra note 124, at 602–04; Brian S. Lowery et al., Concern for the In-Group and 
Opposition to Affirmative Action, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 961, 971–72 (2006). 
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their nonprejudiced attitudes126 or even attempt to “dismantle” their privilege 
by supporting inclusive policies.127 However, doing so may not necessarily 
subvert the existing hierarchy, but rather may help to maintain an appearance 
of rejecting the hierarchy. While this egalitarian approach acknowledges 
marginalized groups’ disadvantage, it focuses on Whites’ ego needs and 
feelings as opposed to harms experienced by disadvantaged groups—thus 
leaving their psychological place in the social hierarchy untouched. This 
focus on protecting the ego as opposed to actually subverting racial 
hierarchies maintains the status quo by focusing on Whites’ feelings as 
opposed to mitigating marginalized groups’ disadvantage. 
White egalitarians who experience a threat against their identity and 
feel the need to manage their egalitarian self-concept may find diversity-
benefits ideology especially appealing. Endorsing the diversity-benefits 
ideology may mitigate the psychological threat white egalitarians 
experience, because it allows them to “dismantle” systems of privilege 
(symbolically) by endorsing an ostensibly pro-diversity belief. It deflects the 
perception that they might be prejudiced and it helps them distance 
themselves from a morally suspect group. Moreover, reinforcing an 
egalitarian self-concept also allows one to feel “morally credentialed.”128 In 
other words, embracing diversity-benefits ideology may actually have the 
pernicious effect of making someone feel like they are egalitarian even if 
their behavior creates outcomes that are not. People who endorse diversity- 
benefits ideology may genuinely believe it to be a culturally appropriate, 
sensitive, and egalitarian approach toward diversity, but they might be 
insulated from explicitly understanding the ways in which diversity-benefits 
ideology also reinforces the status quo. As we discuss in the next section, 
egalitarianism may also insulate Whites from recognizing their own desire 
for occupying the top of the hierarchy and reaping the benefits that status 
confers.  
D. Dominance, Hierarchy, and Diversity Entitlement 
Social Dominance Theory postulates that societies are organized into 
group-based hierarchies in which the distribution of limited resources favors 
dominant groups at the expense of subordinated groups.129 As such, dominant 
 
 126 See, e.g., Apfelbaum, Sommers & Norton, supra note 106, at 918; Hillary B. Bergsieker, J. Nicole 
Shelton & Jennifer A. Richeson, To Be Liked Versus Respected: Divergent Goals in Interracial 
Interactions, 99 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 248, 261 (2010). 
 127 Knowles et al., supra note 124, at 602–03. 
 128 See Benoît Monin & Dale T. Miller, Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice, 81 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 33, 34 (2001). 
 129 JIM SIDANIUS & FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY OF SOCIAL 
HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION 31–32 (1999). 
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groups derive psychological and material benefits from the privileges they 
receive in the social hierarchy. This benefit gives dominant groups the 
psychological motive to maintain the status quo—a social dominance 
orientation (SDO). Prior research documents attitudes that correlate with 
SDO. For example, those high in SDO report higher levels of prejudice, 
greater political conservatism, and decreased support for redistributive 
policies such as social welfare and affirmative action.130 
The theory also postulates that the hierarchical organization of societies 
results from processes, such as individuals’ decisions and behavior, socio-
cultural practices, and institutional actions. Each of these processes is shaped 
by legitimizing myths—or consensually held values, attitudes, beliefs, 
stereotypes, and cultural ideologies.131 These myths can be hierarchy-
enhancing, organizing society in ways that sustain dominant group 
hierarchy, or hierarchy-attenuating, countering group-based dominance.132 
For example, racism, meritocracy, and sexism are all hierarchy-legitimizing 
myths. Conversely, egalitarianism is a hierarchy-attenuating myth. The force 
of these myths in bolstering the hierarchy is largely propelled by their 
consensus across groups.133 That is, the more widely accepted these myths, 
the more impactful they are at maintaining or attenuating the hierarchy.  
Diversity-benefits ideology may serve as a legitimizing myth operating 
in legal reasoning and social scientific practices to maintain White 
dominance. This hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myth may be particularly 
pernicious because it is facially egalitarian and appeals to widely held beliefs 
about the value of diversity. Diversity-benefits ideology encompasses a 
belief in the hegemonic benefits of diversity. That is, the ideology professes 
a uniformly equitable experience of diversity for different groups. As 
mentioned earlier, this appeals to egalitarianism—a consensual value in 
American society. Yet the ideology actually positions white students as key 
beneficiaries of diversity, mimicking existing hierarchies where Whites are 
on top. Thus, for Whites who possess a strong orientation toward social 
 
 130 See P.J. Henry et al., Social Dominance Orientation, Authoritarianism, and Support for 
Intergroup Violence Between the Middle East and America, 26 POL. PSYCHOL. 569, 577–78 (2005); 
Shana Levin et al., Social Dominance Orientation and Intergroup Bias: The Legitimation of Favoritism 
for High-Status Groups, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 144, 153 (2002); Felicia Pratto et al., 
Social Dominance Orientation: A Personality Variable Predicting Social and Political Attitudes, 67 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 741, 742–43 (1994). 
 131 See Felicia Pratto, Jim Sidanius & Shana Levin, Social Dominance Theory and the Dynamics of 
Intergroup Relations: Taking Stock and Looking Forward, 17 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 271, 275–76 
(2006). 
 132 Jim Sidanius et al., Social Dominance Orientation, Hierarchy Attenuators and Hierarchy 
Enhancers: Social Dominance Theory and the Criminal Justice System, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 
338, 340 (1994). 
 133 SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 129, at 46–47. 
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dominance, diversity-benefits ideology may not only appeal to their 
dominant desires, but because of its egalitarian façade, may also nurture an 
expectation they may not consciously know is there.  
Egalitarianism and social dominance seem orthogonal with respect to 
their implications for inclusion. After all, people high in SDO tend to 
disfavor redistributive policies whereas egalitarians usually favor them.134 
How can such disparate ideals be represented within a person? Moreover, 
how can these ideas operate in tandem to negatively influence inclusive 
policy support? As discussed earlier, egalitarianism can coexist with 
seemingly disparate biases. Further, SDO may not only manifest explicitly. 
Although no studies have examined implicit forms of SDO, implicit bias 
research and research on social dominance can together provide us with the 
tools to make an informed hypothesis about how implicit orientations 
towards social dominance may foster an entitlement towards the perceived 
benefits of diversity to the detriment of inclusion.  
E. A Psychological Cocktail 
Research in social psychology treats egalitarianism and social 
dominance as psychologically dissonant.135 However, these constructs may 
coalesce in ways that are integral to the way people interpret diversity-
benefits ideology and succumb to diversity entitlement. Diversity-benefits 
ideology appeals to egalitarian sensibilities, but the uninterrogated, implicit 
understanding within the ideology (that Whites are the primary beneficiaries 
of diversity) may appeal to implicit social dominance sensibilities. Though 
there is some work to suggest that desire for hierarchy can operate at 
unconscious levels,136 this has not been rigorously investigated. Our future 
work will begin to construct measures of implicit social dominance. 
Presently, however, our preliminary empirical work discussed in the next 
Part begins unpacking the role explicit preferences for group-based 
dominance and egalitarianism play in cultivating entitlement to diversity. 
This study explores a conservative test of our hypothesis by examining the 
relationship between egalitarianism and explicit SDO and support of 
inclusive policies. 
 
 134 See Pratto, Sidanius & Levin, supra note 131, at 283. 
 135 Id. Egalitarianism and dominance comprise two subscales within the SDO measure used in social 
psychological research. However, the two constructs are seen as orthogonal and the individual items that 
constitute the measure only capture explicit expressions of dominance. Id. at 282–83. 
 136 See, e.g., Larissa Z. Tiedens, Miguel M. Unzueta & Maia J. Young, An Unconscious Desire for 
Hierarchy? The Motivated Perception of Dominance Complementarity in Task Partners, 93 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 402 (2007). 
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III. DIVERSITY RATIONALES AND INCLUSION: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
A. Overview 
We conducted a study as a first step toward examining the effects of 
diversity-benefits ideology on inclusion.137 In this preliminary study, we 
were interested in testing the effects of exposing white people to a diversity-
benefits ideology modeled after the Court’s diversity rationale. We were 
particularly interested in examining these effects among white people who 
thought of themselves as egalitarian but also expressed a desire to preserve 
the racial hierarchy. We predicted that when egalitarian Whites who were 
also high in social dominance viewed a diversity-benefits rationale for 
diversity, they would express less support for policies that emphasize the 
inclusion needs of historically marginalized groups (e.g., black students) 
compared to policies that emphasize the inclusion needs of historically 
privileged groups (e.g., white students). Four hundred and fifteen Amazon 
Mechanical Turk workers138 participated in the study, of whom 289 were 
white, 203 were women, and 104 were students currently enrolled in a 
university. 
B. Procedure 
The study instructed the participants to role-play being a program 
officer for a foundation that gives money to universities to help fund their 
diversity initiatives. In this position, they viewed policies that different 
universities from across the country planned to implement. We informed 
them that the name of each university had been removed for blind 
assessment.139 They were instructed to evaluate policies by assigning points 
to each one. Further, we mentioned that the foundation would use their point 
allocations and general policy ratings to make final funding decisions. 
Participants were given a total of 100 points to allocate between all six 
policies. As part of the study, participants were randomly assigned to view 
one of four rationales for pursuing diversity before they began their task. 
Each condition represented a rationale considered in Bakke—reducing 
historic underrepresentation, redressing societal discrimination, benefiting 
minority communities, and diversity benefits. For example, participants in 
 
 137 Kyneshawau Hurd & Victoria C. Plaut, Diversity Entitlement: How the Language of Diversity 
Benefits Impacts Hierarchies of Inclusion (2017) (unpublished data) (on file with authors). 
 138 Amazon Mechanical Turk is a crowdsourcing Internet marketplace that enables individuals and 
organizations to coordinate the use of human intelligence to perform tasks such as surveys. See Gabriele 
Paolacci et al., Running Experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 
411, 411–13 (2010). 
 139 Although policies in the study were based on policies currently used by universities all over the 
country, the universities and diversity initiatives in this study were fictitious. 
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the diversity-benefits condition saw the following statement: “One reason 
often given for pursuing these initiatives is that all students benefit from the 
experiences and perspectives that a diverse student body can provide.”  
After viewing their respective rationale, participants then saw six 
policies that represented two different policy categories. Three policies, 
which we label “isolation-focused,” centered on mitigating underrepresented 
group members’ sense of isolation and solo status. The other three policies, 
which we label “benefit-focused,” centered on increasing the benefits of 
diversity by “equally distributing” students from underrepresented groups. 
Policies within each category were matched. For example, one benefit-
focused policy instructed departments at the university to adopt mandatory 
study groups for first-year students that reflected the diversity of the first-
year class and to “evenly distribute factors such as gender and ethnicity/race, 
enabling students to learn from one another.” The corresponding isolation-
focused policy also instructed departments at the university to adopt 
mandatory study groups for the first-year students but to structure the groups 
such that “no student from a traditionally underrepresented group is isolated 
as the only member of their gender and/or ethnicity/race,” meaning some 
pods would contain clusters of underrepresented students and others might 
not. Participants gave each policy points, then rated how much they 
supported each policy and how effective they believed each policy to be. 
C. Measures 
Participants completed a sixteen-item measure of SDO.140 The scale has 
two subdimensions: SDO-Dominance (SDO-D) which constitutes support 
for the active maintenance of oppressive hierarchies in which high-status 
groups dominate and control the prerogatives of low-status groups, and 
SDO-Egalitarianism (SDO-E) which constitutes support for group equality 
and equal opportunity. We used responses to this scale to identify 
participants low and high in both dominance and egalitarianism. We 
interacted these subdimensions to explore how dominance and 
egalitarianism moderated the relationship between diversity-benefits 
ideology and support for inclusive policies. Participants also answered 
questions about their diversity-benefit expectations, such as “I have a right 
to benefit from diversity,” and “My racial group should have the opportunity 
to benefit from diversity.” Additionally, participants answered open-ended 
questions pertaining to why they believed in the pursuit of diversity, and 
whom they thought diversity policy should most serve. Answers to these 
open-ended questions were coded.  
 
 140 Ho et al., supra note 118, at 1010–12 (providing the sixteen-item SDO scale). 
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D. Preliminary Results 
We found promising preliminary support for our hypotheses. 
Participants exposed to the diversity-benefits rationale supported benefit-
focused policies over isolation-focused policies with marginally significant 
differences. This preference was moderated by egalitarianism (i.e., SDO-E) 
and dominance (i.e., SDO-D). That is, participants who reported high levels 
of egalitarianism and high levels of dominance particularly supported 
benefit-focused policies over isolation-focused policies. Moreover, the 
responses to our open-ended questions proved to be very rich. A large 
number of participants cited reasons for pursuing diversity that emphasized 
diversity benefits (e.g., prejudice reduction, learning outcomes). A much 
smaller but discernible set of participants cited more redistributive reasons 
for pursuing diversity (e.g., access to opportunity, redressing historical 
injustice). In response to the question “who should diversity policy most 
serve,” those participants who cited more benefit-related reasons for 
pursuing diversity overwhelmingly mentioned that diversity policy should 
serve majority students as well. Conversely, participants who cited more 
redistributive reasons for pursuing diversity more often mentioned that 
diversity policy should serve minority student needs primarily. Notably, 
nearly all of the aforementioned participants supported diversity policy 
generally and saw diversity as something universities (and they themselves) 
should pursue. That is, nearly all of the participants were self-professed 
egalitarians, yet a divide in who the primary beneficiary of a perceived 
resource should be persisted. That divide corresponded to differences in 
endorsement of diversity-benefits ideology.  
 These data provide preliminary evidence for the sense of entitlement 
that diversity-benefits ideology can yield. Independent of condition, 
participants who freely prioritized diversity benefits were more likely to feel 
that diversity should most serve dominant group members in addition to 
nondominant group members. Further, when certain policies centered the 
needs of minorities, participants in the diversity-benefits condition rated 
those policies less favorably than policies that centered the benefits to 
dominant groups. Taken together, these data provide preliminary evidence 
for entitlement to diversity among majority groups who endorse diversity-
benefits ideology.  
E. Implications for Inclusion 
This study is among the first to examine the joint operation of 
egalitarianism and dominance in determining policy support. The normative 
claim here is not that diversity is bad or that wanting diversity is harmful. 
Rather, the focus on diversity benefits espoused in law may be constituted 
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by and contribute to psychological processes that actually undermine 
inclusion by cultivating a sense of entitlement among dominant (e.g., white) 
groups. The diversity rationale facilitates a diversity-benefits ideology that 
appeals to egalitarianism and dominance sensibilities such that it feels good, 
does not upset the status quo, and precludes policy makers from adopting 
institutional policies that may be better situated to insulate historically 
unrepresented students from the harms associated with being 
underrepresented.  
Although the study does not measure implicit dominance, it provides 
initial support for the role dominance and egalitarianism together can play in 
cultivating an entitlement to diversity. The diversity-benefits ideology, 
though appealing, leads Whites to prioritize diversity policies that benefit 
them over diversity policies more directly tailored for racial minorities. The 
opportunity to benefit may lead those with a strong orientation toward social 
dominance to prefer policies that, while still pro-diversity, may not be as 
effective in addressing the particular inclusion needs of racial minorities. 
This approach toward inclusive policy may prove harmful to the 
achievement, well-being, and retention of racial minorities in the long run. 
Future research will examine these implications in greater depth.  
CONCLUSION 
In our Introduction, we mentioned a white student who expressed 
disappointment that his classes lacked African American students. The 
remarkable aspect of his stance was his claim that he had paid for and 
expected the diversity that an education at this particular institution had 
promised. Unfortunately, the student’s entitlement fits squarely within the 
ideological framework of the time—a framework constructed through the 
decades-long interplay of Supreme Court rulings on affirmative action, 
universities’ enactments of diversity policies, and social science data that has 
emphasized the benefits diversity provided to the education of all students, 
and sometimes especially white students. However, when one further 
unpacks the student’s reasoning, what stands out about his stance is not just 
his entitlement to diversity, but that in possessing this entitlement, his 
imagination for what diversity could look like in educational spaces was 
limited. He did not lobby the university administration to increase the overall 
number of African American admissions; nor did he attempt to imagine 
alternative modes of engaging in intergroup contact. Rather, he sought to 
configure the educational space in a way that served his own perceived 
needs.  
The student’s educational imagination is not the only one truncated by 
a diversity-benefits ideology. While the numerous benefits of diversity 
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articulated by social science research are important, the focus on diversity’s 
benefit to white students interacts with people’s psychological desires to 
maintain the status quo that can ultimately cultivate an entitlement to 
diversity. When law sanctions that entitlement by positioning these benefits 
as necessary for the use of corrective strategies to achieve diversity in higher 
education, the court’s imagination surrounding diversity in education is also 
limited. The preliminary research discussed in this Essay begins to 
demonstrate that this entitlement and subsequent conception of the 
educational setting can have potentially negative consequences for inclusion, 
particularly for racial minorities. Moreover, it suggests that the elevation of 
a diversity-benefits rationale relative to others may not only stem from but 




141 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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